CRES Connecticut Real Estate Salesperson - Set 1 - Part 3

Connecticut's main fair housing list in § 46a-64c(a)(1) names thirteen protected classes, including lawful source of income; disability and sexual orientation appear in other provisions, so refusing a housing voucher violates the statute, per § 46a-64c(a)(1).
Option a is incorrect because seven is the count under the federal Fair Housing Act; Connecticut expands well past it by adding creed, ancestry, age, lawful source of income, and more, so the federal number badly undercounts the state's main list.
Option b is incorrect because nine falls between the federal seven and Connecticut's thirteen but matches no actual count in the main list; the statute enumerates thirteen characteristics in that subdivision, so stopping at nine simply omits several protected categories.
Option d is incorrect because eleven still understates the main list; even before counting disability and sexual orientation from their separate provisions, the primary subdivision alone reaches thirteen, so eleven leaves out two of the enumerated characteristics the statute expressly protects.

A purchaser of a new unit may cancel within fifteen days after executing the contract before conveyance; this differs from the five-day resale certificate window, so the two figures must never be conflated, per § 47-269(a).
Option a is incorrect because five days is the resale certificate cancellation period for an existing unit delivered by hand; a brand-new unit sold before conveyance follows the separate fifteen-day rule, so this borrows the resale figure for the wrong transaction.
Option b is incorrect because seven days applies only to a resale certificate delivered by mail, not to a new-unit purchase; the mailing rule for existing units has no application when a buyer contracts for newly built construction before conveyance.
Option c is incorrect because no thirty-day cancellation right appears in the Act for any condominium purchase; this doubles the actual new-unit period and reflects a general assumption rather than the specific fifteen-day figure the statute assigns to new construction.

The conveyance tax is payable by the person conveying the property upon recording the deed, so the grantor, the seller, bears it; the statute places no share on the buyer. See § 12-495.
Option b is incorrect because the buyer is a common guess because buyers pay many closing costs, but this particular tax falls on the party conveying title, and the statute names the grantor, not the purchaser, as liable.
Option c is incorrect because splitting the tax equally may reflect what parties sometimes negotiate privately, but the legal obligation the statute imposes rests solely on the grantor; a side agreement cannot rewrite who the law makes liable.
Option d is incorrect because the buyer's lender finances the purchase but is not a party to the deed and owes no conveyance tax; the levy attaches to the grantor recording the transfer, never to a third-party lender.

Connecticut requires each municipality to assess property at a uniform rate of seventy percent of its present true and actual value, so the mill rate applies to that reduced figure, not full value. See § 12-62a.
Option a is incorrect because assessing at one hundred percent would tax full market value, which is exactly what the statute avoids; Connecticut deliberately sets the ratio below full value to reach a uniform taxable base statewide.
Option b is incorrect because eighty percent is a plausible-sounding fraction but not the statutory figure; the legislature fixed the assessment ratio precisely at seventy percent, and municipalities have no discretion to raise it to eighty.
Option d is incorrect because fifty percent understates the taxable base and would shrink municipal revenue below what the law contemplates; the uniform ratio is seventy percent, higher than half but still short of full market value.

Connecticut terminates a month-to-month tenancy by lapse of time plus a notice to quit given at least three days before termination; the state has no thirty-day notice rule, per § 47a-23(a).
Option a is incorrect because the thirty-day figure is imported from other states and appears nowhere in Connecticut's statute; students who assume a uniform national rule land here, but Connecticut's notice to quit runs on a far shorter three-day clock.
Option c is incorrect because fifteen days matches a deposit-return trigger, not the notice to quit; borrowing an unrelated number from the security-deposit rules produces a period Connecticut's summary process statute simply does not recognize for terminating the tenancy.
Option d is incorrect because sixty days doubles the mistaken thirty-day guess and strays even further from the statute; nothing in Connecticut law stretches the notice to quit that long, making this the least accurate option of the group.

Connecticut records conveyances on the records of the town where the land lies, so the town clerk keeps the land records; the state has no operative county recording office. See § 47-10(a).
Option a is incorrect because the county recorder is where many states file deeds, but Connecticut abolished operative county government decades ago, so no county recorder exists to accept the deed for this transaction.
Option b is incorrect because the county clerk handles court and records duties elsewhere, yet Connecticut assigns land recording to the municipality; naming a county officer misplaces the function in a state built entirely around towns.
Option c is incorrect because the secretary of the state maintains business and corporate filings, not real property records; deeds are indexed locally by the town clerk, never centralized in a statewide recording office in Hartford.

Section 29-453 carries no monetary credit, fine, or penalty, and the affidavit expressly creates no warranty beyond the transfer of title; only the condition report carries a five-hundred-dollar credit, per § 29-453.
Option a is incorrect because that five-hundred-dollar figure belongs to the residential condition report under a different statute; students routinely transplant it here, but the smoke and carbon monoxide affidavit deliberately carries no such credit at closing.
Option c is incorrect because no fine attaches to this affidavit at all; the statute is structured as a simple disclosure obligation without an enforcement penalty, so importing a thousand-dollar sanction reads a punitive mechanism into a provision that contains none.
Option d is incorrect because the two-hundred-dollar figure comes from an unrelated false-guaranty-claim provision, not from anything governing smoke detectors; attaching it to the affidavit borrows a number from a different statutory scheme entirely and misstates this section's effect.

A prescriptive easement in Connecticut requires adverse use continued uninterrupted for fifteen years, the same length as adverse possession although the two rules sit in entirely different statutory titles. See § 47-37.
Option a is incorrect because twenty years is the old common-law easement period students expect and is the intended trap, but Connecticut's land title fixes the prescriptive term at fifteen years, matching its adverse-possession clock.
Option b is incorrect because ten years is too brief to ripen a prescriptive right, so the servient owner could still block the crossing and defeat the claim because the required continuous use had not accrued.
Option c is incorrect because five years corresponds to disability-tolling grace periods and other short deadlines in the statutes, not to the ripening term for an easement, which demands far longer uninterrupted adverse use in Connecticut.

Connecticut imposes an affirmative duty to remediate toxic lead where a child under six resides, and remediation means testing, abatement, or management of the materials, going well beyond the federal rule that merely requires disclosure, per § 19a-111c(a).
Option a is incorrect because abatement is only one of three permitted methods; the statute's verb is remediate, which also allows testing or management, so naming abatement alone as the mandatory response understates the owner's actual set of choices.
Option b is incorrect because mere disclosure is the federal Title X standard; Connecticut deliberately goes further by demanding actual remediation once toxic levels and a resident child under six coexist, so limiting the duty to disclosure describes the wrong jurisdiction's rule.
Option d is incorrect because nothing in the statute compels moving the child; the obligation runs to the physical hazard through remediation of the materials, and inventing a relocation requirement confuses protecting the occupant with correcting the toxic condition itself.

Connecticut's condition report tells buyers a concrete foundation may be inspected for pyrrhotite deterioration by a licensed professional engineer who is a structural engineer, not a home inspector or any other engineer, per § 20-327b(d)(4)(G).
Option b is incorrect because a home inspector performs a general visual survey and lacks the engineering credential the statute demands; pyrrhotite deterioration is a structural concrete question the warning specifically routes to a licensed professional engineer trained as a structural engineer.
Option c is incorrect because the warning does not accept just any professional engineer; it narrows the qualification to one who is a structural engineer, because assessing foundation deterioration from pyrrhotite requires that particular structural specialization rather than a general engineering license.
Option d is incorrect because an appraiser estimates market value and never inspects concrete for structural failure; valuation credentials have no bearing on diagnosing pyrrhotite damage, which is why the statute names an engineer rather than any appraisal professional.