CRES Connecticut Real Estate Salesperson - Set 4 - Part 3

A tenant representation agreement engages a broker to act as the tenant's agent, locating space and negotiating lease terms while owing fiduciary loyalty to the tenant rather than to the landlord who ultimately controls the premises.
Option a is incorrect because a property management agreement hires a broker to operate and lease space on the owner's behalf, aligning the broker with the landlord's interests, the exact opposite of representing a tenant seeking space.
Option b is incorrect because a listing agreement authorizes a broker to market a property for an owner or landlord, so it serves the party offering space, not the company searching for premises to lease.
Option c is incorrect because a transaction brokerage agreement makes the broker a neutral facilitator owing no undivided loyalty, which is incompatible with a contract that expressly commits the broker to advocate for the tenant alone.

To a customer the agent owes honesty and fair dealing, meaning truthful treatment and no active misrepresentation, even though the customer is not a client; the agent may not deceive the buyer but need not advocate for him.
Option b is incorrect because undivided loyalty is a fiduciary duty reserved for clients, obligating the agent to place their interests first; an unrepresented buyer is a customer, so he receives fair treatment but not the allegiance owed to a principal.
Option c is incorrect because keeping the buyer's confidences would arise only if the buyer were the agent's client; because this agent represents the seller, he has no duty to protect the customer's private information and could not owe such confidentiality.
Option d is incorrect because the complete package of fiduciary duties, loyalty, obedience, confidentiality and the rest, flows only to a principal under an agency agreement; a mere customer is owed the far narrower baseline of honest, fair treatment instead.

A buyer representation agreement is the employment contract by which a purchaser hires a broker to act as the buyer's agent, owing fiduciary duties of loyalty and advocacy while searching for and negotiating a suitable property.
Option a is incorrect because a listing agreement engages a broker to represent a seller in marketing property, so it sits on the opposite side of the transaction from a contract designed to protect a purchaser's interests.
Option c is incorrect because a transaction brokerage agreement produces a non-agency facilitator who owes no fiduciary loyalty to either party, which conflicts with this family's clear intent to obtain a dedicated advocate bound by fiduciary duties.
Option d is incorrect because a net listing is a seller-side compensation structure tied to sale proceeds above a target amount; it has nothing to do with representing a buyer or defining the duties owed to purchasers.

Accounting requires the agent to safeguard and report all money and property belonging to others, depositing funds like earnest money promptly into a trust account and avoiding commingling; the agent must be ready to account for those funds.
Option a is incorrect because loyalty requires placing the client's interests first, a matter of allegiance rather than record-keeping; while an agent who steals deposits also breaches loyalty, the specific act of segregating and reporting funds is the accounting duty at work.
Option b is incorrect because disclosure is about revealing material facts to the principal, such as a competing offer or a defect; handling and safeguarding the earnest money is a financial-stewardship task, not the communication of information the disclosure duty demands.
Option c is incorrect because obedience means following the client's lawful directions, yet properly depositing trust funds is required by law and professional standards regardless of any instruction; the agent must handle the money correctly even if the client says nothing about it.

An exclusive-right-to-sell listing guarantees the named broker a commission if the property sells during the term, regardless of who procures the buyer; even a sale arranged by the owner herself obligates payment to that single firm.
Option a is incorrect because an exclusive agency listing lets one broker represent the owner but still allows the owner to sell independently without owing a commission, which directly contradicts the guaranteed payment described in this scenario.
Option b is incorrect because an open listing may be given to many brokers at once, and only the one who actually produces the buyer is paid; that competitive, non-exclusive structure is the opposite of naming a single protected firm.
Option d is incorrect because a net listing sets the owner's guaranteed proceeds and lets the broker keep anything above that figure as commission; it defines how the broker is paid, not the exclusivity or coverage this scenario emphasizes.

Disclosure requires the agent to inform the principal of every material fact affecting the transaction, including a buyer's willingness to pay more and confirmed financing; withholding such information would deny the seller the knowledge needed to decide wisely.
Option b is incorrect because confidentiality runs the other direction, guarding the client's own secrets from outsiders; it never justifies hiding helpful facts from the very principal the agent serves, so it cannot describe the duty to report a buyer's position.
Option c is incorrect because accounting is limited to the proper handling and reporting of money and documents held for the client; a buyer's price ceiling and loan status are transaction facts, not entrusted funds, so this duty simply does not reach them.
Option d is incorrect because obedience concerns carrying out the seller's lawful instructions, yet the agent here is volunteering vital information rather than following a command; sharing what the market reveals is a reporting duty, distinct from doing as told.

Loyalty obligates the agent to put the client's interests above the agent's own and above third parties; ignoring a richer commission to secure the best terms for the buyer is a direct expression of undivided loyalty.
Option a is incorrect because accounting deals with tracking and returning money and property held for the client, such as an earnest money deposit; it does not address the agent's choice to resist a financial temptation that conflicts with the buyer's welfare.
Option b is incorrect because obedience is about following the client's lawful directions, but nothing here involves an instruction the buyer gave; the agent acted on his own judgment to protect the client, so obedience is not the operative duty.
Option c is incorrect because reasonable care concerns the competence and diligence an agent brings to the work, such as researching values and meeting deadlines; the scenario turns on resisting a conflicting incentive, which is a matter of allegiance, not skill.

Implied agency forms from the behavior of the parties rather than any stated words; when a broker acts like an agent and the client accepts those services, the law recognizes an agency relationship despite no written contract.
Option a is incorrect because express agency requires the parties to declare their agreement in spoken or written words, which is exactly what is missing here, since these two established their relationship entirely through actions and never articulated any terms.
Option b is incorrect because a universal agency grants an agent power to handle essentially all of a principal's affairs, a far broader authority than this narrow home-search relationship, so the label describes scope rather than how agency arose.
Option d is incorrect because designated agency is a brokerage arrangement where a firm assigns individual licensees to represent opposing clients within one company; it addresses how a firm allocates representation, not how this unwritten relationship first came into being.

Obedience requires an agent to follow the principal's lawful, reasonable instructions promptly and faithfully; because scheduling showings on weekday evenings is a proper directive within the scope of the listing, the agent is bound to honor it.
Option a is incorrect because confidentiality protects a client's private information from disclosure to others, such as the lowest price a seller will accept; it safeguards secrets rather than compelling the agent to carry out the seller's practical scheduling instructions.
Option c is incorrect because accounting concerns the careful handling and reporting of money and documents entrusted to the agent, like deposits held in escrow; it addresses financial stewardship, not the obligation to obey a client's directions about showing times.
Option d is incorrect because loyalty demands that the agent place the seller's interests ahead of everyone else's, including the agent's own; while related, it governs whose interests come first rather than the specific act of complying with lawful instructions.

Express agency arises when a principal and agent state their agreement openly, in words, whether written or oral; the signed listing agreement is the clearest example, spelling out authority, duties, and compensation directly.
Option b is incorrect because implied agency would arise from the parties' conduct rather than a stated agreement, so it fails here because the homeowner and broker put their intentions into an explicit signed writing instead.
Option c is incorrect because ostensible or apparent agency depends on a third party reasonably believing authority exists from the principal's appearances; nothing here turns on outward impressions, since the authority was granted directly and unmistakably in the contract.
Option d is incorrect because ratification creates agency after the fact, when a principal accepts an unauthorized act already performed; this contract established authority before any action, so nothing needed later approval to become binding.